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In this paper, professor lmre Hronszky gives a general overview of technology as a problematic issue
In society Historically, from the XVIth artisan’s struggle to DDT side effects, there had been many conflicts
between society and technological development There has been a great number of efforts for a theoretical
harmonisation; but the main propose of that paper, is to get a balanced point of view, between too much
pessimistic and confident att itudes.
En este articulo final, el profesor Imre Hronszky ofrece una visión general de la tecnologia como pro-
blema social. Históricamente, desde el conflicto de los artesanos en el siglo XVII a los problemas causados
por el DDT, han existido numerosos problemas entre la sociedad y el desarrollo tecnológico. También ha
habido un gran número de intentos de armonización. Pero el principal propósito de este artículo es conse-
guir un equilibrado punto de vista, entre las actitudes excesivamente pesimistas y las triunfalistas.
Azken artikulu honetan, lmre Hronszky irakasleak teknologiari buruzko ikuskera orokorra ematen du
gizarte-arazoa den aldetik Historian zehar, XVII. mendeko artesauen gatazkatik DDTK eragindako arazoe-
taraino, problema asko sortu dira gizartearen eta garapen teknologikoaren artean. Halaber, armonizazio-saio
asko egin dira. Artikulu honen asmo nagusia, ordea, jarrera pesimisten eta triunfalisten arteko ikuspuntu ore-
katua lortzea da.
There is a technological revolution recently, the omnipresence of which is al-
ready experienced both in production and everyday life. This revolution realises or
promises a lot for mankind by contributing to the solution of basic social problems
through producing goods, improving heal th.  Mankind has never wi tnessed a tech-
nological  breakthrough of  th is measure. But there is a growing awareness of  very
deep problems ar is ing f rom this technological  growth.  Fol lowing a long histor ical
period of trust in and enthusiasm for technological growth, now there is much more
concern, there is a bivalent approach in evaluating the recent events and the future
possibi l i t ies.  Moreover,  huge masses begin to ident i fy the danger of  a threatening
catastrophe. The “environment bomb”, the depletion of some resources, the overall
deterioration of the environment, the role of civilisational factors in the growing rate
of cancer in industrially developed countries, less noticed than the easily identifiable
environmental deterioration, are some points adding to these fears of catastrophe.
The tendency of developing hazardous technologies and lack of their security (or at
least its feeling), the growing scepticism regarding industrial growth continued, a cri-
tical attitude toward the social meaning of technological growth as a whole, leading
to the call for a “sustainable development”, are elements of an overall criticism.
Empirical sociology shows that issues of technology became one of the major
events people are concerned about in leading industr ia l  countr ies.  Technological
growth, or at  least i ts understanding, current ly seems to be deeply schizophrenic.
This deep divide in the interpretation of technology can often be found even in the
often fluctuation of one person’s opinion from one to the other extreme.
These extremes in everyday evaluation of technology are reflected in scientific
investigation to the problems of technology in society. This investigation has been
moving into two basic direct ions, wi th a week br idge between them. One type of
research only focuses on nothing but the acceleration and effectivity of technologi-
cal growth, like most innovation studies, the other type tries to concentrate on the
wel l  exper ienced and the possible harmful  ef fects in highly cr i t ical  manner.  Both
recent revolutionary growth in technological capacities promising new social possi-
bilities as well as the unsolved problems of threatening harmful effects, and espe-
cially the tension between these two, make technology a candidate for an important
and enduring political debate.
There is pressure for the analysis and evaluation of the social meaning of tech-
nological growth we have been facing in modern history, and to explore in the direc-
tion of technological development in the future. The magnitude and complexity of this
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analysis requires a comprehensive invest igat ion,  which would include the coopera-
tion of much specialized expertise, from different natural and social sciences to di-
fferent sorts of humanities. This need of new types of analysis stimulates the emer-
gence of new sciences such as environmental  economics and management.  But,
even when the solution of the new task forces it to a deep restructuring, it is also sure
that the cognitive problem is by far not just an extension of economic thinking, as
many claim. Ar is ing f rom a prevai l ing overal l  “ instrumental ist ic”  approach to any
social problem would be one of the possible tempting but damagous shortcuts in the
invest igat ion to reduce the approach to an extension of  calculat ion of  costs and a
more effective management (including legal regulation) of technological growth.
The problems with technological  growth become comprehensive now. They
awake the need for cr i t ic ism not only in relat ion to the recent ly quickly deepening
environmental  deter iorat ion but to the social  purposes of  th is technological  growth
and the changes that occur in the meanings of social relations, in the human rela-
tions to nature and in individual human behaviour, through their “technologisation”
( their  technological  reconstruct ion).  Therefore,  more than extended economics and
management science, a comprehensive reest imat ion of  the role of  technology in
society and nature is needed. The appropr iate task can perhaps be an overal l  re-
orientation of all the sciences and humanities which concern with and are concerned
for issues of the technology-society(nature) relationship, including disciplines on the
human indiv idual .
Both history and the phi losophy of  technology have a task in these needed
investigations. A philosophically oriented historical overview of the role of technology
in society can moderately contr ibute to this necessary knowledge fund, too. This
introductory presentat ion tr ies to supply some elements of  a type of this account.
The main parameters to be followed in our historical overview are: the changing type
and direction of knowledge in technology, the expectations toward technology con-
cerning its social role and the changing role technology has in society.
Rem ar k s o n t h e p er i o d s o f an t i q u i t y an d m o d er n t i m es
An overal l  h istor ical  look at  the role of  technology in society can be given
through a triadic classification. Accordingly, there was a special type of technology
and i ts ’  ro le in society in ant iqui ty,  best expressed by the Greek term “techne”.
Beginning from the late medieval times, actually in modern time, a new type of tech-
nology was gradually emerging. It is difficult to give it an appropriate English name.
In German there is the term “Technik” and I shall use “empirical technology” in this
presentation to identify this special sort of technology in history. With this one can
contrast  a th ird histor ical  type by introducing the term “science based technology”
or “technoscience” for our time, for the more or less scientifically constructed tech-
no log ies .
2
2. Classifications and terms are not innocent, of course. They always turn the attention to some
feature(s) and distract the attention from some other features of the issue under scrutiny.
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The Greeks referred to some al leged tr ickiness in the act iv i ty of  craf tsmen
when they spoke about “techne”. It was thought that the objects behaved in contra-
dict ion to the intent ions of the human users,  they resisted them. According to the
interpretation, the artisan was a peculiar sort of human being, able to find the way to
nature’s objects,  which were assumed to be some sort  of  l iv ing beings, normal ly
following their own intentions. His power was not to force nature to obey him (this was
the “power” of  the magic ian) but  to “ t r ick i t  out” .  Technological  reconstruct ion of
objects of nature was believed some sort of constrain. Natural objects have their way
normal ly but some people can have an impact on them and change their  normal
behaviour.  Technology in the form of “ techne” was ident i f ied as some sort  of  sub-
ject ive capaci ty c losely bound to the art isan. Rules could help on a moderate way
only,  for  the objects behaved rather indiv idual ly (compared to the standardized
objects of  technoscience!) ,  and beyond the rules the indiv idual  ski l l  of  the master
was always very important.
Oriented toward preservation of the achievements acquired by a quasi-Darwin
istic, spontaneous evolution of technology, the main spirit of craftsmanship was not
inventory,  i t  was conservat ive.  There was no organized social  type of  act ion l ike
experimentation to regularly provide new knowledge and its condensation into rules.
Rules emerged from a long spontaneous practice. When rules were found they were
preserved and the need for preservation hindered any systematical search for new
situations and new rules to generalise knowledge from individual situations. Techno-
logy developed very s lowly,  through constrains from the outside, which forced the
masters to accommodate to new situations.
To sum up, one can say that, according to the ancient type of interpretation,
something living and subjective met something of the same nature in a technologi-
cal activity. Technology as techne was not seen as an activity reconstructing basic
natural conditions of human activity but as a human capacity for realising human pur-
poses by living with and accommodating to nature. Technology was strongly conser-
vative, oriented toward preservation of the “tricks” and rules found by chance.
First the 14th century gave birth to an idea for technological growth as a cons-
cious need and subject of pride in reflections on mining. This idea of technological
growth was associated to the idea of social progress. It can be seen as a seculari-.
sat ion of  the Christ ian idea of  moving toward God’s imperium in history.  People
began to put their trust in technology for redemption from poverty or to get rich. In
modern t imes gradual ly the idea of  technological  growth as steady basis to social
progress became one of its characteristic ideological self-reflections. It began in the
early 17th century and was fully developed by the second half of the 19th century
when the industr ia l isat ion ideologies assigned a central  posi t ion to technological
growth. Technological  growth was transformed as industr ia l isat ion ideology by the
self-reflection to an exogenous variable, an outer necessary condition of social pro-
gress.
The persuasion that slowly begun to grow from the 14th century, that mankind
can cont inuously and endlessly widen i ts technological  power over nature,  was
based on successful ly progressing art isanal act iv i ty,  of  course. This act iv i ty was
based on empirical knowledge like techne, it is true, but gradually on an empirical
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knowledge that was partly gathered in new ways, The 16th century gave proof to a
tr iumphal process of  widespread and cont inuous invent ive act iv i ty and the cummu-
lation of technical inventions, One of the most important factors was the emergence
of systematic experimental exploratory activity. (Let us refer to the metallurgists or
the medical doctors, who looked for new medicines, for many of different artisans-
hips,) Transforming natural things through the artisans’ work began to be seen a prin-
cipal resource of wealth. Generalised to an ideology of the artisanal activity, in pro-
testant interpretations all was supported by the idea that human beings have a task
from God to finish his work.
An upgraded acknowledgment of  a lchemy and the importance at t r ibuted to i t
in the renaissance was exaggerated expression of  the new consciousness. The
alchemist magician became one of the key figures in the self-image of this epoch.
Being able to experimentally explore the secrets of nature, as it was supposed, the
alchemist symbolised the self-trust in the new nature-transforming capacity of man-
kind.
For many reasons, among which the rapid development of  the arts was only
one, the empir ical  knowledge of  nature in a suddenly and unexpectedly widening
world (think only of the geographical discoveries) began to rapidly attain higher cog-
ni t ive status,  together wi th a growing tension. The new empir ical  knowledge was
found in strong contrast to left knowledge and their acquirement methods. The abi-
lity to know things began to get a profound reconsideration by the end of the 16th
century, and the (non-educated) artist, referring to its successful material practice,
began to chal lenge the universi ty scient ists in issues of  knowledge of  natural  pro-
c e s s e s
3
.  In contrast to the old type in ant iqui ty,  the techne, in this new histor ical
period regular efforts were already made in different types of arts to widen this empi-
rical, rule-based-knowledge. The idea of cognition by transforming things, too, and
not only an “empirical turn” began. Technology, however, was mostly based on trial
and error type experimentat ion. Except for mechanics in construct ion of scient i f ic
tools, “theories” very seldom gave more than a very vague orientation until the end
of the 18th century, even much later.
There is an important  development in the ideologies of  technological  power
from the early 17th century with Fr. Bacon.
In an ef fort  to overcome the inher i ted opposi t ion of  craf ts,  based on purely
empir ical  knowledge, and the scholast ic sciences, Bacon prophesized human pro-
gress based on a new type of natural science and of technological inventions, them-
selves the resul ts of  the appl icat ion of  the (new) science. These invent ions would
make nature’s powers regularly utilisable for human purposes, gradually approach-
ing the complete mastery of nature. He predicted a new age in history in which natu-
ral science would take the lead, to initiate developing technology. He formulated with
3. Perhaps the most famous of these was when Bernardo Palissy, the potter challenged the scholars
o f  Sorbonne in  the  second ha l f  o f  the  16 th  cen tu ry  to  compare  the i r  knowledge.  He c la imed tha t ,
notwithstanding that he was untaught, he knew more and more valuable than the scholars in empirical issues
of the real world.
324
NEW TECHNOLOGIES AS SOCIAL PROBLEM
this the very idea of a scientific technology, that still is only under partial realisation.
He was persuaded that science consists of, first of all, the well established methods
of research, of discovery. Against the widespread belief in the secret “inventive acti-
vity” of the alchemists, Bacon argued for a methodical empirical research leading to
laws of nature as the basis of advancing the utilisation of nature. With modern times
nature became object of utilisation and scientific technology the appropriate tool for
this.
Bacon, attempting to give guide how to conquere nature, was exaggerated by
his ideas of methodical research. Orienting his metodologism as knowledge of ver-
bally communicable rules against any “secret” activity, like alchemy, he thought that
the true methodology can easily, quasi-mechanically lead to new inventions. Expres-
sing a new consciousness, of  which Bacon represented, the late 17th century was
full of promises, how, through methodical research, easy inventions will be realised
and make the people weal thy
4
.  The Basconian vis ion was a new type of ,  science
based technology, too, having important social role, not only a “new science”.
Ridicul ing the magicians and alchemists,  Bacon fought for acceptance of  his
principle: “natura parendo vincitur”, that nature can only be “conquered” by obeying
its laws. Remember the subjective capacity to make tricks against nature’s objects,
understood as active subjects themselves, was the frame of referring technology in
its techne period, where constrain always meant some strong limit to technological
capac i t y ,  human  ac t i v i t y  was  concep tua l i sed  as  accomoda t ion  to  na tu re .  The
exaggerated picture of magicians having the key to the secrets of the objects com-
pleted this ref lect ion on the work of  art isans, interpret ing craf tmanship in terms of
subjective ability (and at least partial secrecy), including the possibility of comman-
ding to nature wi thout any l imi t ,  in pr inciple.  The need for the explorat ion of  the
necessities and the recognition of the real, not only imagined, freedom of manipula-
tion by obeying nature became the ontological and epistemological basis to the suc-
cess story of progressive “conquering” of nature through technological development
from the 17th century.  As i t  became commonplace, knowledge of nature and the
growing exactness of  natural  science opened a l imit less perfect ion of  technology
transforming nature into a servant of mankind. And nature itself seemed an endless
reservoir  of  possible resources. I t  seemed to be possible to gain these resources
endlessly out of nature if its laws were obeyed to. The scientific enigineer became
the secularized inheritor of the alchemist, in this relation. He seemed to be able to
real ize what was histor ical ly dreamt of ,  because the knowledge of  laws of  nature
narrowing down the predictive capacity seemed to be the only limit to the transfor-
ming activity.
This second part of the history of technological development and its ideologies
became the tr iumph of  the “homo faber”  idea: of  mankind, able to “domest icate”
nature wi thout l imi ts,  by explor ing natural  laws and obeying them, conceptual is ing
4. 17th century was already a feverish trial to get reach, or embetter the human conditions by
technical inventrons. It is much less important here that all this was much more an ideology of inventive
activity than a real success. The disappointment with this inventor ideology led, early 18th century, to the
sarcastic humour of the Gulliver on the Royal Society’s activity.
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nature itself as being just a passive subject of its technological reconstruction. The
real  meaning of  any endur ing resistance of  natural  objects to their  technological
reconstruction, experienced so far, was identified as nothing but a misguided action,
based on a naive technical activity when trying to act against natural laws. Nature
seemed to have submitted itself to its fate of getting transformed to taste if its laws
were followed.
The trust  in th is “domest icat ion” of  natural  forces based on the progress of
science predicted a calculable and planned future.  This interpretat ive f ramework,
that mankind is ceaselessly moving forward, through technological progress, from its
nature-given state to a world of  sel f -consciously constructed condit ions of  human
life, emerged in the 17th century. But it became the ruling one only in the 19th and
the f i rst  hal f  of  the 20th century.  This (non-cr i t ical)  idea of  progress had i ts root
beside science, and later in economy, first of all, in technology.
It is important that the only real limit to human technological activity was iden-
tified in nature itself, in its natural laws. There was no thought to the possible limits of
technological activity to be set by the acting human beings themselves, e.g. to the
meaningfulness, of  the presumed endlessly progressing technological  reconstruc-
tion of nature in the long run. Romanticism, emerging mostly from the end of the 18th
century,  and forceful  only for a short  t ime, who offered conservat ive cr i t ic ism on
industr ia l isat ion,  was quickly ignored as non- important comment on the tr iumph of
the progressive reconstruction of the natural world into an artificial one. These reflec-
t ions could easi ly be dismissed in those countr ies where the industr ia l  revolut ion
begun to run.  There was no chance to look backward in a histor ical  per iod when
those strata which formed the type of society by an overweight, were committed to
technological growth, no chance to argue for the preservation of earlier values and
modes of life. They could successfully be pushed back to the private sphere, as sub-
jective, e.g. artistic reflections on technological growth without a real critical account
to the “real” ,  economic and pol i t ical  wor ld of  th is growth
5
.
5. Looking forward in history as the progressing self-realisation of mankind, the young Marx (in
Economical-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844) claimed to identify technological action toward nature as a
main emancipatorical force for mankind. According to his understanding, history of technology is the
appropr ia t ion  o f  na tu re  by  mank ind  in  a  doub le  p rocess  o f  mutua l  med ia t ion  o f  ob jec t i f i ca t ion  o f  the
capacities acquired through the appropriation of nature and appropriation Itself. It leads, he hoped, to the
perfect “naturalisation” of the human being on the one and to the ever progressing “societalisation” of nature
on the other end of the interaction of the human being with nature The history of Industrialisation and the
recent development of technology ( including the application of high-tech to social relations and individual
psyche) surely requires another approach, too. According to this, technoscience is only a successful
deve lopment  o f  Ins t rumenta l  con t ro l  capac i t ies ,  a  revo lu t ionary  s tep  in  i t s  ins t rumenta l  e f f i cacy .  The
philosophical-anthropological idea of emancipatory power of technology does not exclude at all the neutral
or crit ical historical sociological view on technology as a control tool having a strong transforming, an
instrumentalising effect on the social relations and individual behaviour, and vice werse, of course. The
recent technological revolution probably is a mixture of both tendencies, running in both directions.
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The idea of  gradual ly complet ing mastery of  the natural  environment through
advancement of  the new science was developed as ear ly as the beginning of  the
17 th  cen tu ry .  The  i ndus t r i a l i sa t i on  i deo logy  f rom the  m id -19 th  cen tu ry  added
something important to th is bel ief .  This is that cont inuous technological  growth is
some sort of necessity. One sort of technological determinism appeared in the reflec-
tions on society. There is no place here even to enumerate the variety of “technology
deterministic” ideas in different social theories. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to point
out that it ranged from a naturalisation of human history (based on the idea of the rei-
ficating conception of a somehow natural-law-like growth of technology as the fate to
mankind, somehow from outside) to ideas in which technological determinism meant
something different. According to these, solving social problems preconditions tech-
nological growth. In the ideological reflexes to changing social (and natural) world
through industr ia l isat ion technology became the moving force of  social  progress,
either as a fatelike outer factor or a precondition, on which the social forces be con-
centrated first, if social progress should be realised.
One of the later elements of the technology deterministic industrialisation ideo-
logy is an interpretation of the invention with the so-called “technological imperative”,
a n  i d e a ,  p e r h a p s  t y p i c a l  a r o u n d  t h e  m i d - 2 0 t h  c e n t u r y .  T h i s  “ t e c h n o l o g i c a l
imperat ive” can be formulated in a descr ipt ive and a normat ive way. According to
the descr ipt ive version technological  invent ions necessar i ly go through. According
to the normative formulation, no control should be practiced over the inventing acti-
v i ty f rom “outside”.  Mankind has ful ly  to explore (and ut i l ise?) the technological
potential available. (The technological imperative has a less philosophical but more
empirical, social science justification as well, when it is argued that economic growth
is based on technology and can not or should not be stopped.) The idea of “tech-
nological imperative” fits into a special type of thinking about partial issues in society:
according to this it is rational when any segment of society regulates itself to maxi-
mise its own purpose. The inclusion of its products into the social whole will be con-
sidered and regulated at the outcomes, in the so called “application context” as an
end-of the-pipeline regulation in a selection and rectification process.
Understanding of any social activity in means-ends terms slowly became pre-
vailed through the social transformation of feudalism to capitalist society. It liberated
the end-setting activity of society, (in principle) from any social structural and ideo-
logical hindrances. Commercial activity and technology were good basis and empi-
rical models to this interpretation. In some ideologies by the end of the 18th century
calculat ion became synonim to the rat ional i ty.  (The preposi t iv ist ic ideology, that
became the basic framework to establish the new Ecole Politechnique in Paris during
the French revolution by 1994, made this identification first for higher education. The
practical consequence was an introduction of a very strong mathematical education
to make calculations by solving equations, where it was already possible (the smaller
part of engineering activity to this time) and moreover (!), to educate the students to
be calculating human beings, giving them this type of culture for their life, so that
they  became accus tomed  to  cons ide r  eve ry th ing  by  l ook ing  fo r  and  tak ing  i n to
account any possible quantitative information.)
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From the mid-19th century the industrialisation spread from the craft to other
fields of work, One example from the second half of the 19th century is the rapid and
widespread dissemination of artificial fertilisation, itself the first element and symbol
of the beginning industrial reconstruction of agricultural activity. With chemistry as a
oasis, artificial fertilisation was the first science based technological activity in agri-
culture.
For a meaningful  phi losophical  and histor ical-sociological  analysis of  techno-
logy, one can find an interesting grasp when comparing the role artificial fertilisation
had for about one hundred year long and our well based fear after this “success”.
This type of analysis begins by stating the necessarily ambivalent nature of any tech-
nology, or to put i t  d i f ferent ly:  any technology shows ear l ier  or later i ts negat ive
effects, too and there is a chance that these become the prevailing ones on the long
run.
One can illustrate a rather strong variant of the thesis on the ambivalent nature
of any human intervention into natural relations by referring to agriculture, as a case.
The first agricultural activities, needed on the long run correcting technologies. In the
long series of these correcting actions Iartificial fertilisation was included by the mid-
19th century. Technologies were to be changed in history because it threatened that
the “side-effects”, necessarily belonging to any technological innovation, in agricul-
tural activity, on the long run, begun to turn down the main ones. Agriculture shows
a continuous story of correcting activities toward any historical type of it, if this run
already for a while. 19th century agriculture, after shorter run successes in intensifi-
cation of the utilisation of the fields, begun to turn over to showing failures, exhaus-
tion of the soil, moving toward an overall crisis, An additional activity, artificial fertili-
sation cured the problem for a while. But on the long run just this activity became the
main source of  problems. Looking at  the causes of  th is turn-over one can f ind a
necessary lack of human knowledge. Any activity can only based on a finite model
of the natural issues to be reconstructed. This finitness of knowledge and ontologi-
cal reasons, too, should be taken into account when explaining the ambivalence of
technologies to human purposes.
We now face  a  recen t  t u rn  t o  b io log i sa t i on .  A  t ype  o f  “accompany ing  re -
sea rch ” ,  se t  f r om the  beg inn ing  o f  t he  new o r i en ta t i on ,  cou ld  pe rhaps  he lp  t o
recognise some sort  of  inf lexion point  ear l ier  than the accumulat ion of  negat ive
effects begins to force us to this recognition. Instead, at the moment, one can face
a repeated, one sided or ientat ion toward the new as i f  i t  were the long expected
panacea. The frame of the comparison, the critical rhetorics is nearly exclusively set
toward the old method, the artificial fertilisation. For ideological reasons a one sided
interpretation is given to a new, but somehow once again one-sided technology, ins-
tead of  developing an accompanying cont inuous cr i t ical  consciousness.
Despite the negligence of the harmful side of technological growth in the ideo-
logical reflections on it, during the early industrialisation period, it actually caused a
lot of harmful effects e.g. on human health, on the environment, etc., of course. In the
19th century,  being yet an especial ly rude phase of  introducing new technologies
into social practice, the harmful effects were much more immediate and were more
carelessly dealt with then they can be today, at least mostly in the industrially leading
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coun t r i es
6
. The typical identification of all this was that these are (perhaps neces-
sary) “side-effects” of the technological progress. The naming of the issue with the
term “side-effect” already worked as rhetorics, suggesting both the necessity of the
named both that it could be only the transitional price for progress, to be put an end
to it by extending the rationality of technological invention.
To summarize some features that ruled the ideologies over technological acti-
v i ty in the 19th century,  one was a bel ief  in endlessly progressing technological
reproduction of any natural relation as a rational activity (both in the meaning of cal-
culability and of human meaningfulness). Another one was that technological growth
was identified with social progress
7
. Typical technologies of the 19th century, at least
in its first part, were still based on methodical-experimental empirical research, on a
lower level of engineering and not on scientific research. Therefore most of the cre-
dit, given to the endlessly progressing technicalisation of natural relations as social
progress, was given for future scientific technology. This is the third characteristic
fea tu re
8
. Technological growth in the industrialisation period focused very narrowly
on industrial goals and the harmful effects caused by industrialisation was not dealt
with or they regulation began to limp very slowly after the introduction of technolo-
g i e s
As an expression of the belief in technology as basis of social progress in the
ear ly 20th century the engineer became a cul tural  symbol in the developed indus-
tr ia l  countr ies,  especial ly in America. Many si lent f i lms took the engineer as their
hero. Some general intention of society to change the nature-given relations by the
work of engineers was expressed in them. New dams, crossing valleys, built up in
the f i rst  th i rd of  the 20th century in Colorado, i l lustrated how mighty mankind be-
came in reconstruct ing nature,  just  as skyscrapers did.  The task of  real is ing of
engineering phantasy gave a new definition to technological progress. Some social
scient ists went further.  They began to ident i fy the main problems in conduct of
society as a lack of “engineering of society” already around the turn of the century.
Th. Veblen, then Dewey conceptual ised the idea of  “social  engineer ing”,  the tech-
nocratic movement in the 30s tried to gain social support to this idea, to realise, they
claimed, an already long ago needed step in social progress.
6. To refer one case, the utilisation of common salt for producing natrium for soap production, a very
important achievement for society had the consequence that, after its first industrial realisation, hydrocloric
acid was simply released into the air for about f ifty years. It had devastating effect on the agricultural
surrounding. The “alcali-bill” limiting this in the early 1840s can be seen as the first state regulation activity
for environmental protection.
7. A comparative look at the successive world exhibitions in the 19th century can show how later the
competit ion among the nations and progress of mankind became expressed in technological terms and in
terms of growth, in capacities to do something quicker, bigger, etc. World exhibitions until recently continued
to reflect on and prolong the feeling that social progress is to be measured by technological growth.
8. Actually the chemistry of artificial fertilisers and the organic dying industry plus the electric industry
originated in previous scientific research in the 19th century.
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So, technocracy claimed two closely related theses. According to one, tech-
nology meant regulat ion and the exper ienced lack of  regulat ion of  social  re lat ions
meant social technology, was missing, the capacity of forming and organizing social
issues in analogy to issues in nature, the original place of technology. According to
the other,  engineers should take the leading role in pol i t ical  bureaucracy,  part ly
because technology became the main factor in social  change and part ly because
social issues should be handled as objects of (regulatory) technology, to make them
effective. Engineers were to be seen, par excellence, the appropriate people to rea-
lise these tasks - according to the technocratic ideology
9
.
It is meaningful to touch upon the socialist interpretations of technology as a
tool  of  solv ing social  problems. Al l  these interpretat ions, notwithstanding whatever
political specificity they were, agreed on the basic importance of accelerating tech-
nological growth as means of social progress. One, of which the effect on the social
practice of the later socialist states was not important but it is theoretically interest-
ing, nevertheless, was a lef t ish “messianist ic dogmatism”,  to lend the term of Gy.
Lukacs for this issue. This dreamed, among others, of a specifically socialist type of
technology, which should have realised an opposite type of unification of the worker
and the object of labour in the process of labour then the, at the beginning of the
20th century just  emerging Taylor ism did,  which reduced the need for the ski l ls  of
the labourer to the extreme. Led by the request of an “emancipatory” relation of the
worker to its labour through a new type of organisation of the labour process, its most
famous representat ive,  Bogdanow developed some qui te modern thoughts on the
effective utilisation of the workers knowledge for improving the labour process.
The ideology of technology which became realised in practice of the socialist
states, by the “burocratic dogmatism”, to lend the other term of Lukacs, utilised by
him to name the opposi te ideological  and pol i t ical  approaches in social is t  move-
ment,  was deeply modernist ,  that means a sort  of  short-s ighted industr ia l ism as a
legacy of the 19th century. By “bureaucratic dogmatism” industrialisation was seen
as the suff ic ient basis for solv ing social  problems under the control  of  the state.
Growth of technology meant the growing amount of goods and symbolised calcula-
t ive planning act iv i ty.  I t  was hoped to make the new social  system more effect ive
than the market system, reconstructing the whole society into a production and con-
sumption system regulated by overall planing activity and controll of the state. Con-
cerning the problem of technological  growth, as in any other relat ion,  the social ist
system ext inguished the counterbalancing power of ,  at  least some sort  of ,  demo-
cracy to the modernist project and its narrow minded growth orientation. All this led
to a type of technological, industrial culture, in which environmental pollution, extinc-
9. Only one US president has been with engineering career so far. Taken into account the nuclear
engineering studies of J. Carter this number growth to one a half. One can wonder about the lack of social
persuasive power of technocratic movement in taking account this fact, too.
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t ion of  resources and enslaving the worker into deski l led work to the extreme, far
overcame i ts capi tal ist ic or ig in
1 0
.
A look back in history on the legitimation speeches of technological growth in
the modernisation period was made. The basis for comparison of the effects of tech-
nological action was the past: either bringing natural forces under social control was
contrasted to natural forces, having earlier an uncontrolled effect on society or the
individual human being, or the meaningfulness of all this was denied in the name of
preserving an earlier way of life. For most people the future of technology seemed to
be the enduring progress of reconstructing and controlling nature in interest of man-
kind. Nature was not problematized as an object of human activity when reproduced
by and into technologies, nor the question, if meaningfulness of technologisation of
future society,  both of  the social  relat ions and the indiv iduum, is l imit less,  was
a s k e d
1 1
. Technology was seen as a social tool and the assumed limitless calculabi-
lity, predictability of technological action gave meaning and security for mankind and
gave the belief of the realisability of any technological action toward nature.
O v e r c o m i n g t h e m o d e r n i s a t i o n p e r i o d ?
Th e i n s t r u m en t a l i s t i c ap p r o ac h t o t h e p r o b l em s
Technology cont inuously real ised more and more of  i ts promises in the last
centur ies,  br inging us to a new, rather comprehensive technological  revolut ion,
based on scientific research, in the last thirty years. Concerning this recent revolu-
t i on  one  can  enumera te  b io tech ,  i n fo rma t i cs  and  compu te r i ndus t r y ,  ma te r i a l s
science, psychology or management science, medical  technologies,  or just  space
indus t r y  as  a  comprehens i ve  i t em:  one  can  f i nd  new techno log i ca l  capac i t i es
everywhere. On the one hand the earlier idea, which was partly a hope until now,
became a large real  potent ia l :  technologies based on new, breakthrough develop-
ments of  sciences are rapidly becoming typical  and the recent technological  deve-
10. The socialist system gave a favourable polit ical milieu to one-sided technological projects, in
which several t imes, alongside the usual short range technological and economic purposes, longterm,
overall technological dreams were the leading Ideas. One case can be especially illuminating concerning the
missing counter-balances to some “bold” ideas.The idea of reversing the course of some rivers originated in
Canada,  in  the  40 th .  Bu t  i t  never  go t  an  appropr ia te  suppor t ,  fo r  the  obv ious  fear  o f  the  poss ib le
consequences. Better to say, the lack of appropriate knowledge of the consequences stopped it. But Stalin
found it a task worthy of the efforts of a socialist state. The later, softer dictature moved much in the same
way. Orienting toward narrow minded short range technological projects in general, it changed several times
for one sided long term endeavours, suffocating their democratic negotiation, building this way the future
social dramas into the technological systems.
11. Some philosophers, like Heidegger disputed this and argued that inclusion of natural forces




lopment promises a fuller realisation of important social purposes than at any time
1 2
.
One part of the modernisation project, inclusion and development of newer natural
capaci t ies for serving the mankind seems reinforced.
But i t  does not need a long t ime ei ther to descr ibe how the so cal led “s ide-
effects” of industrial growth became one of the most serious social problems in our
t ime. The very rapidly accelerat ing industr ia l  growth in the last  per iod, af ter the
second world war, extended the “side-effects”, too, in an accelerated way and made
the problems of “side-effects” global. The accelerating tendency to rapid destruction
of natural resources of civilisation, by continuing the type of industrial growth so far,
made obvious the short-sightedness of the industrialisation ideology and the lack of
economic and legal  regulat ion mechanisms.
Recent technological growth shows a sort of schizophrenia and an open pola-
risation concerning the evaluation of its possibilities, even when one approaches the
evaluation question purely instrumentally. The term “purely instrumentally” is used to
refer to an approach in which the meaning of technological growth is not questioned
and therefore any criticism is oriented only toward achieving (a safe) growth, in which
the problem is identified as one of method. (With the importance of criticisms toward
the human meaning of  technological  growth as a whole or some special  technolo-
gies will be dealt later)
1 3
.
Four types of problems are usually mentioned as the most important ones. The
first one is the rapidly extending deterioration of environment. Environmental pollu-
tion caused by non-appropriately developed technologies and the problem of hazar-
dous waste already has a global dimension. The other one is the depletion of (some
types of) resources, a threatening problem already in the near future. The third pro-
blem is that mankind must understand that there are some natural limits not to over-
come by technologies. The problem of global warming can be first mentioned here
1 4
.
12. Electronisation and molecular biology are the usual trivial references in this relation. Let us
mention that a networklike progress, in which each element somehow presupposes the others, is actually
going on, that not only sectors of technology will be revolutionised. The sciences in the forefront need to their
purposes the evolution of others and they give an aid to the others. The case for micromechanics could be
an example, for many experts evaluate that it is beginning to make a similar jump as microelectronics in the
last 30 years, itself partly based on the evolution in microelectronics, among others. This jump promises very
important progress in medicine, among a lot of fields of application.
13. To give a simple case to differentiate between the two types of criticism one can call in mind the
problem of “rent-an-uterus”, the problem of “wage mother”. For some, it is nothing but a problem to solve
safely, that means it is a problem of method, for others it is to be opposed on ground of basic value
commitments, that means it  IS a problem of purpose. Problems relevant for medical ethics are trivial cases
where an obvious value plurality accompanies technological development but many other fields show the
same feature.
14. It is about the story that mankind with its agriculture, urbanisation, e.t.c. accommodated itself to
a rather stable climatic and natural geographic situation and a change in the average temperature caused
by industrial activity would cause overall climatic and geographic changes like the raise of the level of sees,
the  change o f  weather  zones ,  e tc .  A l l  th is  wou ld  cha l lenge mank ind  in  an  unbearab le  measure .  The
neglected “side-effect”, cummulation of carbondioxide in the athmosphere begins to be the main industrial
effect.
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This later problem shows especially clearly how misleading is to tranquilise oursel-
ves  conce rn ing  the  ha rmfu l  e f f ec t s  o f  t echno log ies  by  l abe l l i ng  them as  “ s i de -
e f f e c t s ”
1 5
. Some sort  of  natural  l imi ts are already found, in connect ion to human
reconstruct ing act iv i ty.  The fourth type of problems ar ises, paradoxical ly,  f rom the
growing effectivity and the deeper level technology nowadays effects on nature. It is




One can recognize that these problems are the effects of full-fledged develop-
ment of the modernisation idea as the leading spirit behind industrialisation. All the
ment ioned types of  problems attack ideas taken as a prel iminary supposi t ions ear-
lier. The first is about “side-effects”, always of secondary importance, the second that
na tu re  was  taken  as ,  a t  l eas t  p rac t i ca l l y ,  i nexhaus t i b le
1 7
.  T h e  g l o b a l  w a r m i n g
reminds us that human technological activity reaches the measure of the globe, as
its limit to extend it in some directions and that actions always effect in a network of
relations. This and the fear of possible chaotic effects reminds us of the limits of the
presupposition of limitless computability of natural processes as predicted.
As ment ioned, cr i t ic ism of technological  growth can include ref lect ion on the
meaningfulness of the purposes, too and calling for a different type of purposes or
it can be reduced to an extended modernistic approach. This latter mainly means the
extension of the scientific calculatory approach to the “side-effects”, too. It thinks that
the problems are only based in lack of further knowledge of methods and not, at least
some times, in some basic assumptions and ontological relations.
Even the more moderate,  instrumental ist ic cr i t ic ism can already show very
deep problems. One of  them is that the recent per iod of  technological  growth is
15. Small “side-effects” can sometimes cumulate in unbelievable measure and become the “main”
ones. Any “exact” calculation of costs of a technological investment made earlier without counting the long-
run effects can mislead and simply shows how much the “exact” economic calculations are issues of choices
of what should be calculated. They actually are the results of some sort social consensus on what should be
calculated. This referring to conscensus nature of these “objective” calculations does not mean, of course,
that setting their limits would only be a matter of negotiation.
16. The civil stratospheric flight can be seen as an appealing possibility in instrumental terms for it
wou ld  reduce  the  f l i gh t  t ime among the  con t inen ts  very  much.  The  so lu t ion  o f  th is  p rob lem needs  a
concentration of the overall technological capacity and its purposeful development. One of the reasons for
this technological project in Germany is this, because it can give an overall direction to technological
innovation. But there is also a very well founded concern about the possible effects on the stratosphere for
there scarcely is knowledge available about the behaviour of stratosphere. It shows a growing new type of
awareness and its translation into research terms that the so called Sanger project, itself intending the solution
of the the reliable flight until 2020 includes from the very beginning a research on the possible “side-effects”.
17. The first recorded case when a bird disappeared from the biosphere was in the 17th century in
Madagaskar. The new “sustainability” approach intends to fight against any annihilation of resources for the
future generations. It seems to be questionable if a stronger variant of this thesis can be validated, even when
intended destruction can be dismissed. Industrial reconstruction of the natural conditions of human l ife, i t
seems, have a consequence in reducing or even destructing some sort of resources, even then, when they
won’t be blindly dealt with like the mentioned bird in Madagaskar.
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mainly based on recent ly born new technologies which, concerning their  safe con-
trol ,  force mankind to face problems of new sorts,  because some of them can be
seen as especially dangerous technologies. One of the possible dangers emerging
through the new successes in a growing mastery of nature through industrialisation
and developing technoscience for th is purpose ar ises from the recent quick con-
quering of the sphere of biology. We are now facing, through genetic manipulation,
the beginning of engineering of life itself. As any earlier step, promising to extend
human controll over nature, it promises liberation from constrains in many directions.
And genetic engineering already is well on the way to realising some of these pro-
m i s e s
1 8
. In its extrapolation, genetic engineering, applied to the biosphere, gives the
possibility of putting the evolutionary fate of existing species, as well as the possibi-
lity of creating new ones at the disposal of mankind. Genetic engineering, promises
the revolutionisation of curing diseases, by intervention on the genetic level. It gives
the possibility of conscious transformation, potentially extended to the whole biologi-
cal world. The idea of becoming a partner of evolution on a much deeper level than
earlier agriculture and biotechnology could occur now
1 9
. But this is a point, too, whe-
re mankind stumbles into one of  the basic condi t ions that made modern science
from the early 17th century to what it is today. Let us make some remarks on this pro-
blem.
Agriculture together with industry in the lat centuries rpoduced a comprehen-
sive “second nature”. This had a strong effect on the biosphere, by forcing species
to accommodate to the new condit ions set by human act iv i ty,  but concerning the
genet ic code i t  had a shal low effect  on the environment,  non-comparable with the
alleged emerging possibility of genetic engineering on biological evolution.
In contrast to earlier agricultural effects it is already possible to construct “arti-
ficial beings” by controlled genetic manipulation but there is no enough knowledge
of their possible effects on the biosphere, comparable to the operational knowledge
of their creation. To escape this problem of engineered life-science there is a choice
in principle as follows. One possibility is to follow the technique of dealing with highly
dangerous art i f ic ia l  products,  already wel l  known in physics and chemistry,  and to
develop a new type of  laboratory science and technology, developing and preser-
v i ng  we l l - con t ro l l ed  a r t i f i c i a l  cond i t i ons  f o r  t he  new b io log i ca l  t echno logy .  Bu t
another appeal ing direct ion is to develop a  genet ic engineer ing which works in -
nature i tsel f ,  under spontaneous condit ions, l ike most chemical  and physical  tech-
nologies This brings the problem of the so-called environmental release. Scientists
18. The rapidly growing diagnostic capacity of genetically caused diseases, new bacteria, working
for pharmaceutical purposes, are just but a few examples.
19. The typical value approaches to the transformation of nature are antropocentric ones. Most of
them are purely instrumentally oriented. Their main question is if the problem at stake can be solved by some
tools There are important challenges to this approach based on some value-commitments, to set limit or to
prohibit some sort of instrumental dealing with these problems. These value-commitments can be anthropo-
or  non-an th ropocent r i c  t ypes .  There  a re  non-an th ropocent r i c  bu t  b iocen t r i c  approaches  too ,  esp .  in
environmental ethics.
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are only at the very beginning of research in this direction, to knowing how geneti-
cal ly produced beings would behave in a non-art i f ic ia l  environment.  In some new
types  o f  expe r imen ts  pa r t s  o f  t he  na tu ra l  env i ronmen t  a re  mode l l ed  to  reach  a
mediat ing stage.
Time and diversity were two parameters for natural evolution to accommodate
to conditions, science has to find something to account for their effect in the selec-
tion process as a technological parameter to be able to include human planing acti-
vity into evolution on genetic level. There can be a well based concern, nevertheless,
that complexity puts some basic constrains on the intention to release into the envi-
ronment of genetically engineered beings.
There are other technologies giving a difficult task to the engineer constructors,
and continuously moving the lay opinion, with the raising development of technolo-
gies of high catastrophic potential in the last 40 years. To put it ostensibly, nuclear
power can be one and transport  of  l iqui f ied gas another case. Contrary to genet ic
engineering, one mostly can know rather exactly what the result of any catastrophe
would be. The safe treatment of these technologies requests a solution of reliability
problems of these technologies, higher by several orders of magnitude than that of
the usual technologies. The very basic relationship to consider this safe treatment is
tha t  o f  r i sk ,  p robab i l i t y  and  damage .  Expe r t s  a rgue  tha t  t echno log ies  w i th  l ow
enough probability to cause damage are safe enough for utilisation, notwithstanding
their damage potential. Then the well known problem arising with these highly dan-
gerous technologies is the answer to the question “how safe is safe enough?” and
who should decide on this. Without being able to go into any detail it is worthwhile to
mention, nevertheless, that it can be misleading to say that the discussion is between
neutral experts and their opponents, the lay movements (the scientific rationality and
the lay irrationality) but between two committed approaches.
Official experts have been doing investigation forming a problem soluble under
some special  preconcept ions and movements oppose these presumptions needed
to the possibility of solution. It is important to understand that the basic controversy
between them is not a problem of more or less exact calculation but of value commit-
ments leading to di f ferent evaluat ions. There are a lot  of  f ights between scient i f ic
rat ional i ty and massive i l l i teracy in technological  af fa i rs in discussions over dan-
gereous technologies, it is true. And there is no excuse for illiteracy when somebody
wants to have a say. But I want to draw the attention to something else. This is that
real political content is mostly covered by this. One of the keys to identify this poli-
tical content is to understand that the debate, liberated from the mentioned illiteracy
vs scientific knowledge layer, is between value approaches.
Discussions over these issues, both over the biotechnology and nuclear tech-
nology, show a non-appropr iate type of  understanding of  how technology should
funct ion in society,  provided the pol i t ical  nature of  these issues in a democracy
would be acknowledged. There are many calculat ions and scient i f ic  researches
made, dealing with the safety issues, true. But most of these calculations and regu-
lations are made without engaging into a genuinely political process. That means an
endur ing t r ia l  of  reducing the problems of  explor ing and managing the ef fects of
t echno log ies  acco rd ing  to  reasonab le  mode ls ,  deve loped  w i thou t  t he  e f f ec ted
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people, as if this management were nothing more than a bureaucratic process only,
based on scientific regulation, and not about people’s fate having their say to it. (To
give some evidence: one point  of  concern about people’s fate may be that in the
existing regulations there is no full financial compensation prescribed to damages,
another one is that,  as damages, mainly indiv idual  and not social  costs,  too are
accounted for. A third problem is how to evaluate the rights of people for choosing
their own living conditions, that means how to evaluate people’s right to state their
fear of living near technologies with catastrophic potentials. The list can be enlarged
without difficulties.)
Scientific expertise may in different ways be abused for bureaucratic reasons
and partial interests in risk assessments. Sometimes scientific calculation itself as it
is becomes a rhetor ics,  covering the value commitments that direct i ts focus, by
declaring itself neutral and not taking into account all the possible alternative calcu-
l a t i ons  and  eva lua t i ons ,  t o  be  made
2 0
.  Even  the re  i s  a  tendency  fo r  reduc ing
scientific expertise to special types of sciences, not including into the arena impor-
tant social  sciences
2 1
.
All this is about expertise. But lay people, as effected ones, have a basic poli-
t ical  r ight  to have their  opinion considered. In ear ly t r ia ls when these type of  dis-
cussions were first organized there was an expectation of making an easier consen-
sus th is way. This was the or ig inal  reason to organize publ ic discussions. This
expectation partly is an extension of the instrumentalistic expectation. By now, more
and more experiences show that a consensus may not be the usual outcome of the
so called consensus meetings and including lay opinion may not be too effective in
solving the dispute this way. The reasons can be numerous. But, no one of them is
enough to return to reducing the decis ion processes to the cooperat ion of  state
bureaucrats,  industr ies involved and experts t rusted by the state alone. Instead,
these meetings should clearly show the genuine political nature of introducing hazar-
dous technologies and should lead to genuine political means to solve the problems
of these introductions.
Often there is a typical  case in technological  publ ic controversies,  of  which
both outcomes are problematic: either a decision will be made without lay participa-
tion justifying this by referring to their non-competence, a reduction of their political
20. At least at the third level of assessings risks, the level of evaluation, alternative values should be
taken into account, just because any technological action can differently effect people and they may have
different value orientations to the issue in question. But more than this, a scientist has continuously to make
methodo log ica l  dec is ions  on  the  leve l  o f  descr ip t ion  a l ready  and these dec is ions  can in f luence the
understanding of the issues to advantage of some and harm of others. Just think of looking for the
representative case for generalisation of issues as a very clear example.
21. Organisational sociology was included into the evaluation of possible nuclear catastrophes first
in 1979, at the investigation of the Harrisburg accident. Being obviously competent in analysis and evaluation
of man machine-system relations in complex technological systems organisational sociology had to fight
out its place, nevertheless. Some hard scientists’ and burocrats’ arrogance was to be identified in this case
and was successfully overcome. The analysis of the 1979 issue initiated Ch. Perrow to his world famous book
on Normal Accidents, published in 1986.
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right in principle, or a win, over expertise, of massive lack of scientific understanding
of the issues at stake. One way out of the impasse seems the inclusion of alternative
expertise as a mediator. Because these issues are tense, due to a lack of trust in the
state and the experts acknowledged by i t ,  t rust  in the inclusion of  values of  the
effected people into the calculat ions by experts may help to get to some sort  of
discussion arena, arguable from both sides, in which the reasons can be made clear
at least. (More to this will be said at my third lecture of the summercourse.)
The need for regulat ion of  technological  growth through a pol i t ical  process
including scientific expertise is today more and more accepted both by state admi-
nistrations and lay people, less, of course, by industrialists. But it is worthwhile to
mention some problems that may cool down any exagerated hope in the effectivity
and simple evolut ion of  the recent or planned regulatory mechanisms even when
they will be reconstructed as a genuine political process.
One problem is with the level (and time limit) of the regulatory actions. Let me
refer to some facts concerning the first. The fact that the fuel for cars proved to be
dangerous for health and the environment led to the reduction of damaging materials
in the combustion products. It diminished the amount of dangerous materials by one
car, it is true, but, because of the growing number of cars, it did not lead to the goals
it expected. Another case can be the well-known story of DDT. DDT proved to be a
dangerous poison to be taken out of  the insect ic ides because of  i ts cummulat ive
behaviour.  The legal  prohibi t ion of  the ut i l isat ion of  DDT led the industry,  among
others, to look for materials that had not been prohibited
2 2
.  Paradoxical ly  enough,
these usual ly proved to be more dangerous than their  predecessors.  Legal  regula-
tion, based on the best wish to improve the situation, led to an undesirable result.
The problems with safety of cars led designers to enhance the safety of newer
cars. As response to this development there is now a tendency to drive faster due to
these achievements. All these cases suggest that the regulating mechanisms some-
t imes  do  no t  wo rk  on  l eve l s  deep  enough  and  on  app rop r i a te  manner ,  l eav ing
deeper structures of  economic interests and regulat ing mechanisms and indiv idual
human att i tudes untouched by the regulatory act ion. They even show something
more: regulatory effects on the non- appropriate level may move society’s reaction in
dangerous direct ions,  too.
The handling of the regulation of these technologies seems based on a cons-
ciously chosen modernist approach, further, especially in the late socialist countries,
in trying to keep the distance of the expert and the rest of the population. But in con-
trast to this official efforts, at the same time, the setting of new technologies became
a deep political issue everywhere. To rely only on expert calculations would mean
deniing this political character in a time, let us call it post-modern, in which people
begin to be more sensitive toward post-material values, like want a part in political
decis ions. Experts can even produce rather persuasive arguments about the very
22. Another way to avoid the problems of DDT caused by the legal prohibition for uti l ising DDT in
developed countries has been to keep their transport to third world countries.
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small likelihood of a catastrophic issue (this is several times not the case!) but, even
then they may miss something belonging to the political nature of the “technological
controversy”. This is that the solution must be trustable. It is because the whole arena
misses the possibi l i ty  of  counter-expert ise and the expression of  the lay opinion.
One way to seemingly avoid conflicts is to deny the political nature of the debate, as
dictatures do, which way does not seem the best one or to give full acknowledgment
to the political nature of main technological debates
2 3
.
It is just this point, the failure to provide simple instrumental results to the pro-
blems of “side-effects”, I think, that makes a lot of recent warriors of the industriali-
sat ion project ,  and their  careless bel ief  in the thesis that growth means progress,
rather angry.  Modernism argued against  romant ic ism by defending a purely instru-
mentalistic approach to technology as social tool and by a naive belief that techno-
logical growth is equal to social progress, at least as its base, requesting that any
valid comparison should be made, through a possibly quantitative way, by omparing
th i s  i ns t rumen ta l  e f f ec t i v i t y  t h rough  ca l cu la t i ons  based  on  expe r t i se .  By  now,
surrounded by a global problem of environmental deterioration, with more and more
menacing t ime shortage for act ion, even ear l ier  v ictor ious instrumental ism proved
itself self-defeating. When the dangerous effects can not be (at least practically) dis-
missed anymore, as i t  was for a long t ime, when gradual ly any account ing for the
effects of  a technology must include these, opening the quest ion “what should be
seen as the main final result, the good effects for which technology implemented or
the negat ive ef fects,  perhaps massively threatening already”?, any simpl ist ic re-
ference to an extension of expert calculations necessarily raises counter opinions.
Clear ly,  no argumentat ion strategy is anymore just i f ied by arguing the same
way for any technology as it seemed during the industrialisation, the modernisation
pe r i od
2 4
. One could object to this statement that technologies should not be seen as
political questions. But they are actually for people think they are, and, as experience
shows, efforts to persuade them about the thruth of the opposite only raised the poli-
tical content of controversies.
Comparing knowledge, avai lable to develop technology in i ts d i f ferent histo-
r ical  per iods,  one can see how much the knowledge base changed from empir ical
know ledge ,  acqu i red  by  chance ,  t o  a  sc ience  based ,  compu te r  a ided ,  modern
knowledge base. We are witnessing that this enormous potential begins to be used
23. Especially poor countries may provide for a third possibil ity l ike a Hungarian vil lage where the
burgomaster  exp la ined  the i r  w i l l i ngness  to  accept  a  was te  d isposa l  fo r  they  u rgent ly  needed the
compensation money. Notice that the issue was changing the safety issue to buying willingness for money,
a well-known issue in the practical regulation in hazardous work as compensated wage. By the way, it may
have been the case that the disposal should have been accepted as safe enough but the decision was made
on a different ground.
24. All this means that no practice seems to be justified anymore when it is only based on economic
and technological effectivity comparisons, taken economy as evaluation of investment costs versus benefits
coming from the utilisation of the technological object, notwithstanding the inclusion of the “side-effects”.
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not only to explore the means leading to the realisation of the technological purpose
but also to the simultaneous exploration of possible “side-effects”
2 5
. One can further
see, that a wider knowledge base begins to show some sort of natural limits to mea-
ningful technological action, too, not only provides for possibility of that an in every
direction and always widening field of nature will be opened to technological action.
It seems that all this has been spoken about so far can be comprised into the
images and realities of science and technology in two, opposing, overall approaches
toward the meaning of  technological  development in society.  The two conceptual i -
sations, to be compared systematically, are a so-called modern age type approach
and, say, if we do not have a, with highly questionable commitments less burdened
terminology, a post-modern age type, respectively.
Modernism, as I understand it, operates with an overall instrumentalistic frame,
w i th  an  ove ra l l  means  and  ends  ra t i ona l i t y  ( i nc lud ing  eve ry th ing  i n  na tu re  and
society), taking everything into account as issue of utility, with the claim of continuous
extensive growth of consumption, and the idea of a universalistic and total change
of the nature-given preconditions of human life. The overall tendency of realizing a
society, led by means and ends rationality, makes effectiveness an overall tendency
and the supreme value.
This overal l  tendency to ef fect iv i ty moves toward real iz ing a special  type of
hierarchical structure, based on elites of economy, politics, the burocracy, science
and technology, the specialists, and is highly demarcationistic toward the lay mas-
ses Together with this, modernism is based on a progressing division of labour, the
acknowledgement of  eminence inside the demarcat ion ( to be expert  for  something
and being superior in this meaning in comparison to other people). Society works,
acco rd ing  to  t he  modern i s t  p ro jec t ,  t h rough  the  con t i nuous  exchange  o f  expe r t
knowledges, worked out for formalised action, above the wide lay mass. Unified with
a tendency from the pol i t ical  power,  in central ised bureaucracies this project  is
moving toward the realisation of a universalistic plan, a special sort of rationality and
appeal to “rational” action. One of the important features of the modernist project is
the insistence on understanding technology as a universal ist ic,  h ierarchical  power,
conceptualising it only as nothing but tool for rational social action.
25. Technology assessment, a bureaucratically institutionalised exploration of “side-effects” and its
development from science and technology policy advisorship toward a social conflict solving activity relying
on expertise will be handled with in my next presentation in detailed manner.
It is worthwhile to mention here already that some overall technological projects are planned to realise
their goal in 20 up to 40 years. A needed research on possible “side-effects” emerges, planned already to
continuously accompany these types of researches. Technology assessment as early warning gets new
importance and must be made continuous. Comparing engineering with pharmaceutics where a sort of
“ techno logy  assessment ”  was  p rescr ibed  a l ready  some hundred  years  ago ,  one  can  wonder  why  th is
exploration of “side-effects” could not effect on engineering thinking, unti l the last some ten years. An
explanation may lay in the different social entrenchment of engineering in comparison to pharmaceutics.
339
IMRE HRONSZKY
It seems that the still widely accepted modernisation thesis on the creation of
condi t ions of  product ion, the progressing universal isat ion progress of  technical isa-
tion of natural issues makes not only the presupposition that the conditions of pro-
duction, in this meaning technology, can be taken under control without any princi-
pal limit. Further the thesis is also held that these conditions are reproducible or pro-
ducible by human action on them without limit. These presuppositions clearly need
a  rees t ima t i on  o f  t he i r  con ten t ,  t h i nk  o f  a l l  t he  ob jec t i ons  conce rn ing  na tu re ’ s  -
behaviour as an organic whole, as setting limits to human action, that mankind needs
accomodat ion t ime to some basic natural  parameters,  that some natural  condit ions
should be seen as unchangable i f  human assets should be preserved, e. t .c. .  The
point is important for it attacks a thesis which would base conditions of the freedom
of mankind in the capacity of mankind to controll or more, to reproduce and produce
natural conditions of human life in an unceasingly advancing historical process. All
this criticism is valid even when it would be meaningful to control and reproduce old
and produce new conditions in nature for the mankind without any limit.
A post-modern perspective for human life makes an emphasis on quality of life
and post-material values, like preserving nature, instead of economic and technolo-
gical growth. It tries to give to consumption a different meaning from modernisation
ideologies.  Indiv idual  creat iv i ty is emphasized against  standardisat ion of  consump-
tion. It does not accept a hierarchical structure for social life, based on the eminence
of some, but requires democracy and part ic ipat ion. Instead of accept ing a strong
order as a necessary consequence to utilising the main tools of modernism (like mar-
ket economy, technological  growth and science, among other elements),  i t  t r ies to
emphasise a much more “playful” life as meaningful, exemplified in political decen-
ter ing and in an everyday l i fe,  resist ing the discipl in ing force of  steady growth of
effectivity.
In my opinion the post-modernist perspective is a direct refusal of the moder-
nist value system. In this quality of direct denial its cognitive technique is just rever-
sing any sign in the opposed system. This can be helpful for concentrating on the
needed changes as a mainly artistic visualisation, through contrasting old and new
value systems, but it is not immediately translatable into a new rationality of action.
The reason for this is that any continuity is missing from it, by the definition of its pur-
pose and cognit ive technique. With this I  want to say, that there is no coherent
leading idea at present, upon which a new understanding of life, including a philo-
sophy of  technology can be based.
The  pe rspec t i ve  o f  t echno log i ca l  deve lopmen t  wh i ch  i s  cu r ren t l y  ga in ing
ground is an eclect ic mixture of  modernism and post-modernism, including some
elements of  post-modern requirements,  taking into account of  some post-mater ial
values. This perspective may be the consequence of ‘negotiation”, primarily realised
on the market in form of changing consumption habits,  but i t  seems that i t  cont i -
nuously needs a political power to make new requirements obvious and forceful.
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On t h e c h an g i n g m ean i n g o f ac t i o n s t h r o u g h t h ei r t ec h n i c a l i s at i o n
Deal ing with technology one side of  the coin is that  technology as techno-
science has developed to the main agent in reconstructing nature (and society) for
human ends. In this function it works as social tool. The other side of the coin is tech-
nology’s active role in defining human ends, This role gains much importance today.
It has two parts. One part is how much a technology, realising human ends, neces-
sar i ly ef fects society by forcing i t  to accommodate to i ts requirements,  provided
society wanted to utilise the progress technology promised. Any historical anthropo-
logy, ethnographic studies and some macro theor ies of  history can show how the
users of technology had to accommodate individual human behaviour and the social
structures to constrains deriving from the inclusion of a new technology in society’s
body. This is one point to show how far people should say that technologies are more
than simple social tools for some ends. To put it differently, technologies are “social
agents” and ends themselves that require that society accommodates to them: with
this the original context will be turned upside down and technologies become ends
instead of exclusively preserving their more moderate role of being nothing but social
tools for some social purposes.
This role of new technologies, introduced into social life, results in a change of
the old social structures and individual human behaviour. This role can be very pro-
blemat ic.  Cal l ing into mind that  developing technologies is an issue of  looking for
profit, being constrained by a rather short time-interwall of becoming profitable and
that technological  research of ten leads to unexpected resul ts,  to much more than
their original developmental purpose, a critical social consciousness and evaluation
of these issues is surely arguable
2 6
.
These changes are really deap. But all these effects on the social relations or
indiv idual  human behaviour can be accounted for  by “b lack boxing” sciences l ike
inst i tut ional  sociology.  Typical  for  these “black box” approaches are the ident i f ica-
tion of the research object as as interaction of two autonomous spheres, assuming
that the exploration of the interface does not need any enter into the core, the mean-
ing of the interacting spheres. According to this type of approach, technologies, to
be able to utilise the potential they have, require some sort of social accommodation.
This is the other side of (institutional sociological) dialectics, often mentioned in the
literature when analysing the mutual effect of technology and society on each other,
when technologies are introduced to solve a social task. It is so to speak the easier
observable part of the interaction. This is the social structural or/and individual psy-
chological “price” for introducing a new type of technology into society. (Notice that
accounting for the interaction of technology and society, this approach does not refer
to more than two, autonomous objects,  leaving their  meaning, their  def in i t ion un-
effected by their mutual interaction, at least basically. One could object to this that
th i s  t ype  o f  i nves t i ga t i on  i s  based  on  p rev ious  demarca t i on ,  I t  i s  impor tan t  t o
26. The usual counter-argument to this is the well-known “let the market work”. One can answer to
this that It is not question that market should have its regulating role but the problem is that this is not any
argument against other social forces to develop their regulating capacity. This is needed, really, for the




recognize that contrary to opinions, th is previous demarcat ion leads not only to
knowledge of a less deeply explored subject but to a changed one.)
But,  as ment ioned, i t  is  only one element of  the problem to speak about the
necessary ef fects,  technologies as “social  agents” have on the social  relat ions, to
make them appropr iate to the use of th is technology. The other component of  the
problem is that “technologisation” of the social problems mostly changes their mea-
ning, structure and form
2 7
.  Technology, th is way, must be seen as meaning giv ing
element in society. If so, this requires a full-fledged philosophical, sociological and
political analysis and evaluation of technology to be developed, not only an institu-
tion sociological investigation.
Technology has been included in philosophical and sociological reflection in a
very moderate way. Fol lowing the immediate empir ical  appearance, technology,
ident i f ied as art i fact ,  as thing and nothing but a neutral  social  tool  in i tsel f ,  real ly
seemed not re levant for  phi losophical( l ike ethical)  and sociological  analysis
2 8
. In
social theory, with some exceptions, the relation of technology to society was taken
as the problem “how society and technology (  as system of art i facts) ef fect  each
other” ,  the problem referred to somewhat ear l ier .  In th is conceptual isat ion society
has something to do with the preconditions of technological activity and the effects
caused by technology on society. This type of conceptualisation dealt with techno-
logy by fo l lowing the usual  analyt ical  approach: ident i fy ing technology “as such”,
they looked for the connections between technology and society. Going further and
observing technology as social action, this classical approach identified a research
object for a purely institutional analysis to understand the cooperation of people insi-
de technological systems as micro society but excluded by definition any analysis of
technological knowledge and the analysis of technological artifacts and systems as
value laden, being themselves focal  points for  value-mediat ing,  even value produ-
cing activity in their reality.
27. To redefine a health-problem in medical terms of different historical epoches, to redefine the food
question in terms of standardized technology (what should be acknowledged as cucumber or sausage), to
redefine a teaching process in terms of some high tech. possibil i t ies may il lustrate this “technologisation”.
For example to correctly apply modern standardized medical tests one has to look at the patients as if they
were standardrzed, like technological objects, even when this can not be realised. To technologire the food
supply for the EU, according to a universally valid measure within EU, brought with it the refusal of some sort
o f  cucumber  to  accep t  as  food .  To  re in tepre t  and  renorm educa t iona l  p rocesses  in  te rms  o f  modern
computers needed to reshape everyday thinking in well-ordered series of decidable questions and answers,
itself surely effecting habits of thinking in general. The problems of health, food production or education,
standing for many to taste, had to be transformed into problems available for the requested technology.
28. One point is here to mention how important is to choose the representative element of a class not
to  s t rong ly  mis in te rpre t  the  who le  th rough the  wrong ly  chosen representa t i ve .  Today  any  ana lys is  o f
technology, requesting representativeness for its findings, should deal with technological systems with their
possible value setting and mediating role, instead of reducing the focus on Individual technological artifacts.
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A lonely German sociologist Linde (1982) put the correct formulation when he
requested br inging “ th ings” back into sociology
2 9
.  The new sociology of  technology
is already on the way of doing that by beginning to analyse technology also as “tech-
nological form of social life” to take the expression given by G. Bohme in a recent
impor tan t  a r t i c l e
3 0
.
The decisive point for accepting this new type of analysis is to understand, as
G. Böhme, another German sociologist puts it, that “after technologising social struc-
tures and social  act ion have not merely become more ef f ic ient (as the classical
analysis could correctly observe) but something else altogether”
31 
We have to chan-
ge the habi t  of  analysing the working of  technology in society only by a (social)
means and ends conceptualisation and go over to a fuller one in which we get ready
to understand how, by “technologising” a social relation, the semantics of the whole
si tuat ion wi l l  be changed I f  th is semant ic change can be ident i f ied by these types
of actions, as it really can, technology becomes, in principle, a full-fledged issue for
sociological and, when dealing with the meaningfulness of the whole and with nor-
mat ive quest ions, for  phi losophical  analysis
3 2
.
Böhme develops a general  sociological ,  actual ly a phi losophical  antropologi-
cal, frame for analysis of technology as follows, First he understands technology as
mater ia l  appropr iat ion of  nature,  fo l lowing other authors,  and then he extends this
approach to society,  understanding social  technologies as “mater ia l  sel f -appropr ia-
t ion of  society” .  He emphasises one point  in th is process of  sel f -appropr iat ion of
society in the way of technologising itself. In his understanding, by technologisation
of social relations society makes itself an object to itself. The most important ques-
tion is what happens to the social relations to be reconstructed by their “technicali-
sation”. At least in the process of technologisation of social relations and social pro-
blems nowadays, that  means by using science based technologies for purpose of
modern formal burocracies, this process is a reification of social relations and pro-
blems (always being in the last analyses problems of human individuals)
33.
I want to mention another important step in the social science and humanities
interpretation of technology, too. This is the social constructivistic approach. Its main
29. In: R. Jokisch(ed):Techniksoziologie, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1982
30. In :  N  S tehr  R .  V .  E r i cson  (eds ) .  The  Cu l tu re  and  Power  o f  Knowledge ,  Inqu i res  In to
Contemporary Societies, De Gruyter, Berlin-NY, 1992, ps 39-51
31 In: N. Stehr... p.40.
3 2 Technology as a whole has been several times interpreted philosophically in some philosophies
of technology in a religious frame as continuing God’s work or in a general philosophical antropological
context.
33. The trend of communication technologies fosters social action that is impersonal and not face-to-




importance is, in my view, that this approach denies the usual first step in analysing
technology-society relat ions. The usual  steps to def ine the quest ioned technology
are first to take over its (mostly one of its) recent definition for social science inquiry,
rather dogmatical ly (committ ing this way a modernist  fa l lacy, i f  the target of  the
analysis is historical one, and loosing from view the usual richness of “definitions”
and the technological controversies behind them, for sociological analysis, if the tar-
get is not historical one), and second to abandon for social science analysis the con-
tent of technology at stake.
Whi le the ear l ier  prevai l ing Mertonian sociology reduced the competence of
sociological analysis to the institutional frame, constructivistic approach shows that
technological artifacts, not being able to be defined without their social context, are
in principle flexible in their definition and able to have different interpretations, and to
change accordingly. For social constructivist analysers of technology any definition
of any artifact is only valid by simultaneously pointing out the relevant social group
for which this technology has this meaning. According to their most basic approach
any historical analysis, but sociological and philosophical as well, should follow the
technological  controversies responsible for the interpretat ion of  any technology.




We can cal l  th is recent type of  technology also techoscience. I t  provides us
with new technological capacities in an accelerated way. Are these capacities partly
requesting new type of individual and society to accommodate to the new technolo-
gies? It is not too much to say that new technologies are partly looking for applica-
tion to social goals? It seems that a yes is the correct answer. Some technological
achievements in everyday life certainly surprise the philosophy and social sciences
in general, not prepared for it for not able to anticipate.
Al l  th is cal ls  for  a phi losophical  and sociological  analysis of  the quest ion of
what sort of social world are we developing now and for what reason are new types
of technologies developing, realising that options by the technoscience challenge to
change earlier patterns of social life and the individual accommodation to them in a
qualitatively new measure and manner. Philosophers, like any other social scientists,
are called to participate in discussions on the new situation. And they are called to
do it without any bias against new technological possibilities but, nevertheless, in full
34. The ancient hunter invented new hunting tools and the optimal utilisation of hunting tools effected
the population as selecting factor, in a mutual accommodation process. Optimal bike racing to compete for
the Olympic medals led to a modern variant of the old process. People turned to the windcanal to define the
appropriate form of the bike. Then the windcanal measurements also defined the appropriate person to the
optimal conditions to bikeracing on the Olympic games. Techno-science defines “more exactly” what people
should be for a special goal if they wanted to optimally utilise their possible tools for a definite social action.
Perhaps the recent not well-enough technologised selection process in gymnastics will follow the way bike
racing shows. This way is a mutual selection process of technological tools and human beings for a special
social purpose by utilising modern technoscience, some sort of producing the human individuals to measure
where the measure is set by the need of a specifically technicalised action. It is a process in which through
technologising the social action the meaaning of the basic purposes also changes.
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awareness of the issue that new potentials of technological development require to
develop new social  structures and behaviours on the base of  these new technolo-
gies This many times can be an expensive price for the utilisation of this technology,
of course, or an unacceptable “side-effect”.
No quest ion that technoscience has become Columbus sai l ing toward new
worlds, it became an adventurial issue, looking for its meaningful development with-
out any ability to forsee important future effects. It seems to widen our technological
power in a revolutionary manner and through it our social capacity to make choices
if we will be careful with it. More than this, achievements in technoscience begin to
show real possibilities of developing new human dimensions. This is one side. The
other one is that, through inappropriate social control mechanisms it cab lead to a
new type of “halved rationality”, to use the expression of Habermas. That means that
mankind develops technological capacities without the knowledge of its meaningful-
ness One has to remember f i rst  that new technologies in society request changes
in accommodation forms (both social and individual), second, that there is a “tech-
nological  push” now, and th i rd,  that  technologies wi l l  be “entrenched” in society.
When entrenched already, there is less possibility to change the situation even when
desired later
3 5
. And worse than this, effects of technology show some sort of unpre-
dictability both in their relations to nature and society.
It is typical and certainly has its dramatizing role, that public opinion and, on a
more sophisticated level, philosophers distinguish periods in history by focusing on
one characteristic feature of the issues, making it the decisive feature. One speaks
this way e.g. about the “information society”. From about the mid-80s people begun
to speak about “risk society”. The term originates from Ullrich Beth, a German socio-
logist. He published a book in 1986 on Risk Society. To be noticed, it brought the
appropr iate term in at  the appropr iate t ime. Strongly under the shock, caused by
Chernobil, there was a quick and broad public reaction.
In its original meaning, given the term by Beck, it actually contrasts the willing-
ness of our time to risk dangers by systematically developing dangerous technolo-
gical potentials in favour of growing wealth even that mankind seems to be ready to
risk self-destruction when blindly running for wealth. In contrast to natural disaster,
war damage and industr ia l ly  caused r isks are included by human act iv i ty into the
sphere of social action.
35. Any large scale technological system shows an example to this story. To interpret without critical
discussion the inclusion of these large scale technological systems into society’s working, as if it were social
progress, can only be interpreted on a social-darwinistic way as progress, because, at least partly, they have
their fate-like characteristics, if they are realised already. The reader, familiar with the idea of Collingridge,
can see that I use his term in an extended manner, including the problem of meaning changing capacity of




According to this version of “risk society” type analysis of the recent problems
of technological development mankind is now on the way to developing a new type
of risk potential: in contrast to any technology of earlier historical periods the possi-
bility of limiting the effects of new technologies is impossible, neither social strata nor
future generations can be excepted from the damages if an accident occurs and, in
contrast  to ear l ier  per iods, i t  becomes impossible to point  exact ly out who is res-
pons ib l e
3 6
. Finally, taken into account the measure of the damage, any compensa-
t ion possibi l i ty  becomes quest ionable.
According to a di f ferent interpretat ion, developed by Niclas Luhmann, taking
off the concerned edge of the term, society begins to be aware of the riskiness of its,
technological, activity means that it becomes understood that it is necessarily based
on an unceasing process of  choices, more and more put into technology. And any
choice is based on some r isks.  Consequent ly i t  is  possible that mankind is l iv ing
more and more safely but riskier. This is a neutral interpretation of a story by giving
a different definition to “risk”. (It is then even imaginable that mankind has been living
ever safer and safer and this tendency shal l  be cont inuing.)  These are al ternat ive
dramatisations of the story of developing and utilising modern technology by society.
(Because one of the next lectures at the course, that of G. Bechmann will be dealing
in detail with the ideas of Beck and Luhmann I do not deal with them here in detail.)
Wi l l iam Leiss recent ly makes an interest ing comparison
3 7
.  He explores what
happened to Fr.  Bacon’  hopes he had put in the emerging new science and ( the
technology, he bel ieved to develop on this basis) .  As i t  is  wel l  known, Bacon be-
lieved that the new science would be the decisive tool for society to overcome the so
called “idols”, the false ideologies in the way of the progress
3 8
.
According to Leiss, Bacon”s visions for science and technology have in many
respects been realised, even much more. But it is interesting that Bacon seems to
have failed because there have arisen new idols of science and technology. As he
puts it, the new idol of tribe is scientism. This is an arrogant belief in the superiority
of science and technology as the only accepted way of knowing. The idol of the cave
is the belief that very breakthrough in science and technology is a triumph for huma-
nity in general. With this opinion this belief divorces technologies from the various
influences in specific institutional contexts. The new idol of the marketplace is the
belief that science and technology mark a qualitative break with all previous human
history, rendering us immune to the “superstitions” that ruled other civilizations. The
36. Think of the problem of the addition of small effects, summarised into an effect over the limit or
synergistic processes.
37. In: N. Stehr R. V. Ericson (eds):.. .  p. 61-73
38. Bacon believed that science and technology would overcome the idols of the tribe (inherent
l im i ta t ions  o f  the  human mind  and  senses) ,  the  cave  ( fo rms o f  cu l tu re  and  educa t ion  tha t  f rame
understanding, the problem of “blinders” by prejudices), the marketplace (limitations of language, especially
as it is used to understand moral situations) and the theatre (false notions perpetuated by great systems of
thought).
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new idol  of  theatre involves deference to an assumed determinism of science and
technology, which leads people to think that they must bring their values and institu-
tions to shape and alter technologies. All this forces people to believe that they are
subject to scientific and technological forces beyond their control. Leiss finishes his
comparison of the recent situation, with that of Bacon, not only by criticising arrogant
scientism, as he calls it, but showing, too, that some sort of unreasonable expecta-
t ion became a false-consiousness on the lay,  too, concerning the capaci t ies of
science. It is, in Leiss identification, the overtensioned expectation of exactness of
knowledge that makes hindrances to environmental  science.
One of the pairs of categories often used for technological criticism is oppo-
sing the natural to the artificial. Notwithstanding the usual case that in many of such
cr i t ic isms these words are part ly used in descr ipt ive,  part ly in a prescr ipt ive way,
without any clear dist inct ion,  and so in pr inciple ut i l isable for  everything, one can
sometimes experience a very alarming contradictio in adjecto for any philosophizing,
the passing over to s imply ostensibly referr ing to these terms in issues of  discus-
s i o n
3 9
.
Coming to the end of the lecture it is to be stated that there is an advancing
project of overall technologisation of society in history. First the production sphere
was the the main target of technologisation from the 17th century until recently. The
household or the bureau work followed it much later and we find there joining up only
in the last fifty years or so. To look at the process from a different angle, the central
historical attack on labour to suply it with technical instruments, was on the physical
labour, the technologisation of mind work was backward.
One of the main character ist ics of  the recent technological  revolut ion is the
overall role of informatics. A lot of concerned writer explicate the mentioned tenden-
cies as the advancing project of “mechanisation of life”, finishing it with the “mecha-
nisation” of the brain. I hesitate to follow the intention hidden in the term: “mechani-
sat ion”,  for  i t  has an actual  pol i t ical  message, the protest  against  the overal l  ten-
dency of technologisation of life identifiing it as some sort of reification, in the name
of indiv idual i ty,  f reedom, and things l ike that.  But perhaps that no technological
development has definite, fixed meaning. It may be that this tendency in technology
development can be directed toward growing freedom of indiv idual ,  and toward
democracy .  Advanc ing  techno log i sa t i on  o f  soc ie t y  need  no t  necessa r i l y  mean
making the adequate sphere of life “mechanised”, depriving it of freedom and indi-
viduality.
39. At the last international meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Technology some people showed
a menu made of genetically prepared materials, claiming the aversion on the basis of their “obviously
disgusting character”. This step wished to refer to some irresistible rejection based on our instincts against
genetically produced food, but instead, it referred ostensibly to something else and raised serious concerns
for its changing the argumentation arena for something irrational. I do not want to doubt in instincts with all
this but only request their discussion.
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“Mechanisation”, and “artificial”, seem to be self-evident judgements for some
critics of the modernist project. For me it seems evident that they are unable to leave
the modernist project with this seemingly most radical protest against it. The reason
for this evaluation is that they are using the same vocabulary changing the signs to
their opposites. But this behaviour does not allow a look for tertium datur, a view for
a different structure and dynamics for technology development, only to accept or to
refuse the old one. The basic question of political relevance concerning the advan-
cing project of technologisation of society’s function is how technology is itself cons-
titutive of social structure, social action and social norms including both the social
i ns t i t u t i ona l  and  the  “ seman t i c ”  aspec t  and  how fo rwa rd ing  t echno log i sa t i on  o f
nature effects nature’s evaluative potential. The basic requirement should be an eva-
luative approach to all this without any previous bias.
The main points this lecture has to say, is that technostructure of society begins
to be a main medium and moving force of society, valid for analysis not only from an
instutional sociological perspective but also as something taking part in the very defi-
nition processes of the meanings of issues in human society. The change in tech-
nos t ruc tu re  o f  soc ie t y  i s  pa r t l y ,  o r  pe rhaps  ma in l y  a  consequence  o f  economic
forces. Even if this is true, technology itself has its own momentum to the whole as
a structured element, having some sort of, in this meaning, autonomous movement
in society, e.g. through it huge system and the ideologies supporting technological
growth, and i ts cul tural  entrenchment.  To put i t  d i f ferent ly,  no economic force can
fully effect what the future shape of the technostructure of society will be but some
other social forces, including technostructure itself will have an effect on it.
Concerning what technology in recent society can mediate,  i t  is  important to
see that even the social form of existence of political power can change, realising
itself more and more as technostructure, as Marcuse made us conscious of it, some
decades ago. Marcuse focused on the problem of labour. Nearly thirty years later the
relation to the environment seems to be of equal importance, just as the relation of
burocracy to the lay publ ic,  provided that a need for making decis ions on nature
around us and a need for democracy continues. All this puts a requirement on tech-
nostructure to develop alternatives. It is a joint task of technological research and
growing public control of it, as I try to argue for it later in the lecture on expertise, to
investigate how much of what is required will also be possible.
Let’s move to the end of the lecture by mentioning a paradox. On the second
stage of historical development of technology, in the modernisation period mankind
bel ieved that technological  processes can be calculated more and more exact ly.  I t
was an extrapolation of the first moderate successes of a rather simple technology,
the l imi ts of  which are rather commonsense nowadays. Nowadays when, including
incomparable more science into the construct ion process, a much more complex
technology is developed with some success we already know that i ts future beha-
viour and i ts ef fects can only moderately be calculated. As a consequence, th is
recognition calls for a continuous analysis and evaluation of the effects of technolo-
gies so that mankind will continuously be able to intervene up to the possible mea-
sure.  Instead of  basing social  l i fe on predictable technological  development we
seem to be forced to acknowledge that some sort  of  adventure is included into
developing technologies just as in any sphere of modern life.
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This presentat ion began with a descr ipt ion of  recent technological  growth
which creates problems both concerning the obvious environmental and health dete-
r iorat ions, caused by a type of  technology developed with a lack of  understanding
for these problems. Simultaneously,  another problem emerged as wel l .  This is the
rather new problem of what purposes technology development should follow at all.
These together show that two periods of technological development stratify now on
each other.
One is the classical industrialistic understanding, being ignorant toward what
was deevaluated as “s ide -  ef fects”.  I t  is  t rue that technologies,  typical  for a new
period, like genetic engineering, might even deepen the problems arising from this
conceptualisation. But, simultaneously, they sometimes already show a new type of
problem. It is rooted in the recent “technological push”. I used this term to refer to a
peculiarity of our situation in which mankind (in the richest countries) left behind one
sort of constrain. In contrast to the the whole historical period so far, in which any
technological  development was t ied to some social  need, the beginning new histo-
rical period constrains mankind to face a problem of new type. The more and more
cont inous technological  push of fers real isable technological  purposes, the social
meaning of  which wi l l  only be constructed when the real isabi l i ty  of  technology is
known or more, the realisation is on the the way or it is already realised.
Technology became an overall meaning giving force for society by informing,
and  recons t ruc t i ng  bo th  soc ia l  r e l a t i ons  and  i nd i v i dua l  human  behav iou r  up  to
human psyche. Through ‘ the strat i f icat ion on each other of  two di f ferent histor ical
periods of technological development mankind simultaneously has to face two pos-
sible effects of recent technologies to avoid. The one is the harm caused by techno-
logies developed for  obviously meaningful  social  needs, including into harm per-
haps quest ionable social  or  psychical  consequences as a necessary condi t ion for
utilising these technologies. ;The other is the threat of “being wagged by the tail”, of
accommodating to technological development through manipulative effects of social
forces with interest in these technologies, by accepting new social goals justificated
first of all through the need of developing these new technologies.
I do not want to make any dark prophetic warning with this or to focus only on
the negat ive side, even when i t  is  obvious as we saw, that interests behind some
technological  push are forced by their  nature to t ry to constrain the major i ty to
accommodate to the push in which their interests, fortune, etc. are realised.
What I have in mind is rather different. Take the production of “virtual reality” as
paradigmatic case and symbol for some future technological development. One can
see that  mankind is moving toward a per iod in which technologies at  work wi l l  be
the motivations for the phantasy and much less the reverse. Awaking phantasies by
technologies can be a new way of life and amusement. Learning to play with virtual
cats engages Japanese kids, and the very fact, that they already feel a challenge to
learn this play,  may be very important,  No quest ion that any such development
needs  a  consc ious  and  con t i nuous  accompany ing  soc ia l  i nves t i ga t i on ,  mak ing
conscious that new development in informat ics teaches us to leave behind us one
sort of natural constraint again (in a true liberating manner) and, perhaps, some tie
to nature as wel l  ( impover ishing the fans of  th is new technique in special  cases).
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Another problem, to show how important it is to intensify social evaluative analysis of
recent technological  development,  is  modern media possibi l i t ies making worthless
some earlier methods of evidence for the court, teaching us to be sceptical in our
senses on a new level ,  as the reverse side of  enhancing possibi l i t ies of  proving
cases at the court through utilisation of new media techniques.
The intentions of this paper may perhaps not satisfy either of the two main par-
ties in interpretation of technological development, neither the optimists nor the pes-
simists. But this was its purpose somehow, for it intended to begin to override their
deep opposition. Committement to critical analysis of the actually or possibly harm-
ful effects of recent technological development and especially for those who suffer
from this, through a non-equitable distribution of harm, should not exclude but make
more credible, if someone finds appealing the new revolutionary possibilities emer-
ging from the new offerings of technology to reconstruct on their base our social and
individual possibilities in widening human freedom.
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